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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze and challenge Jean-Luc Marion’s thesis about the 
relationship between the doctrine of the simple natures and Cartesian metaphysics. First, I will point 
out some problems with the structuralist method underlining Marion’s approach. Next, I will show 
that it is impossible to turn epistemological notions (simple natures) into the cogito, an ontological 
notion. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting that, contrary to what Marion thinks, in turning the 
simple natures into the cogito, Descartes was adopting an argumentative strategy very common to 
Augustine’s thought. 
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Resumo: Esse artigo tem como principal objetivo analisar e criticar a tese defendida por Jean-Luc 
Marion referente à relação entre a doutrina das naturezas simples e a metafísica cartesiana. Em 
primeiro lugar, discute-se alguns problemas decorrentes do emprego do método estruturalista por 
Marion. A seguir, procura-se mostrar a impossibilidade de converter noções epistemológicas (as 
naturezas simples) em uma noção ontológica (o cogito). Finalmente, o artigo conclui-se sugerindo 
que, ao contrário do que pensa Marion, para conceber o cogito, Descartes adotou uma estratégia 
argumentativa muito comum ao pensamento de Agostinho. 
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Descartes’ work Rules for the direction of the mind is an unfinished treatise dating from his 
early career (1628). This work is mostly concerned with methodological issues and scientific 
problems. The Rule XII, however, unlikely the preceding ones stands out as a turning point in that 
treatise, for it is exclusively concerned with epistemological issues. That is, the scientific and 
methodological problems so far treated in it leave room for what we could properly call a discussion 
of cognitive topics. In fact, due to the shift in his philosophical interests it is very easy to realize that 
Descartes is engaging in a much more epistemological path2. In this kind of ‘second part’ of the 
Rules3 Descartes explains that knowledge acquisition must begin with what he calls ‘simple 
natures’. According to him, the simple natures are those cognitive notions that are unable to 
undergo further analysis and which can be grasped immediately and intuitively by the 
understanding. Descartes sums up the main theme of the Rule XII as follows: “Here we shall treat 
of things only in relations to our understanding’s awareness of them, and we shall call ‘simple’ only 
those of which the cognition is so clear and so distinct that they cannot be analyzed by the mind into 
others more distinctly known” (Descartes, 1996 [AT 10], p. 418).  
After defining what simple nature is, Descartes goes on to distinguish them into three 
categories. According to him, there are three different kinds of simple natures: the intellectual, the 
material and the common simple natures. The intellectual simple natures are those which can only 
be grasped by the understanding by means of its ‘natural light’4, such as the ideas we have of 
‘knowledge’, ‘doubt’, ‘ignorance’, ‘volition’, etc. On the other hand, the material simple natures are 
the product of sensation and imagination, since they are properties of bodies, such as the notions of 
‘extension’, ‘shape’, ‘movement’. Finally, the common simple natures are subdivided into two 
groups: the ‘reals’ and the ‘logicals’. The real simple natures are those which can be applied to both 
the material and the intellectual simple natures, such as ‘existence’, ‘unity’, ‘duration’, etc. The 
logical simple natures in turn are those which allow the other simple natures to be linked together 
 
2 Descartes’ main concern in Rule XII is to explain how one gains knowledge through sensory perception. For this 
reason, it is necessary to define the elements involved in this cognitive process and Descartes does it in the following 
way: “As to what concerns the cognition of things, two factors alone have to be considered: ourselves who know and 
the objects themselves which are to be known. Within us, there are four faculties, which we can use for this purpose, 
namely understanding, imagination, sense and memory. The understanding is indeed alone capable of perceiving the 
truth; but yet it ought to be aided by imagination, sense and memory [...]. On the side of things to be known, it is 
enough to examine three things: first, that which presents itself spontaneously; secondly, how we know one thing by 
means of another; and thirdly, what truths are deduced from them. This enumeration appears to me to be complete and 
to omit nothing to which our human powers can apply” (Descartes, 1996, [AT 10], p. 411). 
3 The first part of the Rules includes the Rules I to XI and, as we I have already indicated, is concerned with 
methodological and scientific issues.  
4 For an analysis of the role of the so-called ‘natural light’ in Descartes’ philosophy, see BOYLE (2009), specially 




by virtue of being ‘common notions’. For instance, the fact that two terms that are themselves equal 
must be equal to a third term (cf. TEIXEIRA, 2020, p. 4, footnote 14). 
Nonetheless, in spite of the undeniable Cartesian focus on the epistemological feature of 
the simple natures, Jean-Luc Marion, a famous Descartes’ scholar, believes that one can deduce the 
metaphysics of the Meditations from the Rule XII. According to Marion, to achieve a metaphysical 
status the simple natures need nothing but to be put in the ‘right order’. In his view, “[w]ith the 
doctrine of the simple natures, the Regulae is already equipped with all the elements required for 
articulating the first proposition of metaphysics” (MARION, 1992, p. 119). For this reason, Marion 
holds that “the transition to metaphysics depends not on any new elements or concepts, but merely 
on the necessity which links them together – and this necessity depends in turn on order” 
(MARION, 1992, p. 119). So one can clearly conclude from this statement that the notion of ‘order’ 
is so important and decisive in the reading of the French commentator that its employment in the 
Rules would certainly result in the metaphysics of the Meditations. In other words, if Descartes had 
articulated the simple natures in the adequate order, he would have seen his Metaphysics emerging 
from these epistemological notions. Nothing else would have been required, according to Marion. 
In Marion’s assessment, the employment of ‘order’ in the Rule XII would have allowed 
Descartes to link the intellectual simple natures ‘to think (cogitare) or to doubt (dubitare)’ together 
with the real simple nature ‘to exist’ (existere). The result of this process of articulating the simple 
natures in the right order would have led Descartes, already in the Rules, to find out and bring forth 
the first metaphysical truth, i. e., the cogito. That is why Marion claims that “[...] the Regulae 
contains the elements of metaphysics (the intellectual simple natures) but not their ordering (their 
necessary lining with the common simple natures) [...]” (MARION, 1992, p. 119). Therefore, the 
constitution of the cogito does not require anything else except the adequate ordering of the simple 
nature that it consists in: ‘to think/to doubt’ and ‘to exist’. For this reason, Marion insists that “what 
is missing [in the Rule XII] is simply the capacity to establish a necessary order between the simple 
natures that make up the Cogito” (MARION, 1992, p. 119). Marion is so confident about the 
interpretive hypothesis he is putting forward that he comes even to assert that it has actually a 
broader range of application. For he thinks that this interpretive hypothesis can be applied not only 
to the analysis of the constitution of the cogito, but also to the analysis of the Meditations as a 
whole: “In fact the Meditations can be understood as a paradigmatic array of ordered groups of 
simple natures necessarily linked together”. Thus, for Marion, it is not required that any new 




into the metaphysics of the Meditations. So if Marion’s thesis is correct, one will be able to 
conclude that nothing new happened in Descartes’ thought during the about twelve years that 
separates the Rules from the Meditations. That is, the Descartes of Marion has always been the 
same, except for the addition of ‘order’. 
In my view, Marion is quite right in claiming throughout his analysis that there is a strong 
similarity between the intellectual simple natures and the properties of the cogito. According to him, 
[t]he parallelism here is quite obvious: cognitio in the Regulae becomes cogitatio (thought) 
in the Second Meditation, with a further echo later in the list in the term intelligens (“thing [...] that 
understands”). Dubium (“doubt”) becomes dubitans (“that doubts”); ignorantia (“ignorance”) 
probably corresponds to affirmans/negans (“which affirms and denies”); voluntatis actio (“the 
action of the will”) appears as the two modes of such action, volens/nolens (is willing, is unwilling) 
(MARION, 1992, p. 126). 
So after correctly assigning the sources of the properties of the cogito to the intellectual 
simple natures, Marion claims that it will be only in the Meditations that Descartes will employ for 
the first time the ‘order of the reasons’5, which in his opinion is a necessary and sufficient condition 
to arrive at the cogito argument. That is why he asserts that “[t]he essence of the res cogitans is 
defined in terms identical to the list of intellectual simple natures”6 (MARION, 1992, p. 127). So, in 
Marion’s view, the element that is lacking in the Rules which will allow the cogito to emerge from 
the simple natures is not due to any new intellectual or philosophical influence acting upon 
Descartes’ mind; on the contrary, it depends only on the internal structure of the text and on the 
dynamics of its argumentation, that is, on the so-called ‘order of reasons’. 
Although at first sight Marion’s interpretation may seem a promising way of employing 
Martial Gueroult’s structuralist method7 to the understanding of the constitution of Cartesian 
metaphysics, it is nonetheless, I think, a problematic one. First of all, in applying the structuralist 
 
5 Of course, this is a clear reference to the classical work of Martial Guéroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons 
(Descartes according to the order of the reasons) on which conclusions Marion seems to base his interpretation of the 
role played by the simple natures in Descartes’ metaphysics. 
6 As to what concerns the notion of res extensa (extended substance), another key concept in the Meditations, Boyle 
sustains that it “[…] correspond[s] to what Descartes calls the ‘purely material simple’ [natures] in the Rules for the 
direction of the mind” (BOYLE, 2009, p. 119). 
7 In his famous book Descartes’ philosophy interpreted according to the order of reasons Gueroult undertakes to 
explain the text of Descartes’ Meditations from a new standpoint. In fact, his aim in this work is to analyze what he call 
the ‘strutuctures’ of the Cartesian argumentation, since, according to him, Descartes’ “[...] philosophy is developed as a 
pure geometry, which owes all its certainty to the internal linkage of its reasons, without any reference to the external 
reality” (GUEROULT, 1984, p. 7). In other words, for Gueroult, the meaning and the truth of the Meditations should be 




method Marion neglects the obvious fact that he is turning epistemological notions (the simple 
natures) into a ontotological notion (the res cogitans or thinking substance) without adding to them 
any further element except ‘order’ or rather a certain ‘logical entailment’, the ‘order of reasons’. So 
I think that it is reasonable to ask how is it possible to pass from the epistemological realm of the 
simple natures to the metaphysical realm of the res cogitans? Thus, as it is characteristic of the 
structuralist method proposed by Gueroult for the reading of Descartes’ Meditations, Marion does 
not take into consideration any external elements and circumstances which may help to get a clear 
understanding of the process of converting the simple natures into the metaphysical entities of the 
Meditations. On the contrary, in the view of both of these French commentators a successful 
interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations needs nothing else but a close attention to the internal 
structure of the text, following strictly the ‘order and connection’ of its reasons. That is why 
Stephen Menn can arguably speak of “[...] Gueroult’s anti-historical conclusions on the method of 
interpreting Descartes”. For “[w]hen Gueroult explains the text of the Meditations, he ignores the 
historical background completely” (MENN, 1998, p. 12). And so does Marion in his interpretation 
of the role of the simple natures in the constitution of Descartes’ cogito.  
However successful the structuralist project might have been, I think this method is not the 
more suitable for carrying out a philosophical analysis. For the structuralist method does not take 
into account the intellectual sources and the historical influences, which without doubt shape in 
some way the thought of any author. This does not mean that by employing the structuralist method 
one cannot pursue a deep and consistent philosophical investigation. The problem is that, due to its 
intrinsic ‘nature’, the structuralist method limits its scope of analysis rigorously to the internal 
dynamics of the text. In doing so, the structuralist method deliberately puts aside and overlooks 
many important facts and elements, which may have contributed to shape its object of study. In 
other words, from the structuralist standpoint the philosophical work is not a product of the 
intellectual and historical environment in which it was born. As a consequence of this assumption, 
one may mistakenly be led to think that the philosophical work has no intention to tackle the 
problems of the determined historical and intellectual situation in which it was produced. And so 
one of the most emblematic features of Western thought is dissolved: the rich dialogue in which the 
great philosophers of all times has engaged throughout the history. For these reasons, there seems to 
be, I think, no great gain to philosophy by making use of such a limited and restrictive method. 
The problems concerning the method he employs is not the only criticism one can make of 




related to the structuralist method as well. This second problem arises from the fact that Marion 
supposes that he can turn epistemic notions into an ontological entity. As we have seen, the French 
commentator argues that it is possible to convert the simple natures into the res cogitans (thinking 
substance) through a process of logical entailment. However, the simple natures cannot be turned 
into a true substance, such as the thinking substance, only in virtue of their being put together in an 
ordained way, because the simple natures are epistemic, not ontological notions. Marion himself 
reminds us, quoting Descartes’ words, that both ‘nature’ and ‘simple’ refer exclusively to the 
cognitive feature of the things perceived by the mind. Thus, he manifestly acknowledges that the 
simple natures have no intrinsic relation to ontology (MARION, 1992, pp. 115-116). In fact, the 
simple natures, as Descartes conceives them, are neither the essence of things nor the elements out 
of which reality is constituted. Descartes himself is cautious enough to warn us that the 
epistemological approach should be carefully distinguished from the ontological one: “[...] As to 
our knowledge single things should be taken in an order different from that in which we should 
regard them when considered in their more real nature” (DESCARTES, 1996, [AT 10], p. 418). 
Therefore, the notion of ‘simple nature’ is employed by Descartes to analyze perceptual phenomena 
in general from a psychological standpoint (in ordine ad cognitionem nostram). For this reason, the 
Rules establishes a sharp distinction between the epistemological and the ontological realm, since it 
deals not with the question of how things are in themselves (prout res singulae revera existunt) 
(Descartes, 1996, [AT 10], p. 418), but with the question of how we perceive and get knowledge of 
them. 
Another argument I would like to advance against Marion’s interpretation concerns the 
role that the simple natures will play in Descartes’ mature ontology. In his latter ontology, that 
which is chiefly put forward in the Principles of Philosophy (1644), the simple natures will become 
what Descartes calls ‘mode’ (modus). The ‘mode’ indicates the properties which inhere to the 
substance or the qualities which belong to the substance. Moreover, another fundamental 
characteristic of the mode is that it has an ‘ontological dependence’ on the principal attribute or 
essence of the substance in which it inheres; thus, the mode cannot exist without relying on the 
substance’s essence (ROZEMOND, 1998, p. 2). In other words, the mode is intrinsically tied to the 
substance to which it pertains (DESCARTES, 1996, [AT 8, art. 56], p. 26). Therefore, the existence 
of modes necessarily presupposes the existence of a substance and its principal attribute 
(DESCARTES, 1996, [AT 8A, art. 53], p. 25). That is why Descartes asserts that one can conceive 




possible to conceive of the modes without necessarily taking into account the principal attribute in 
which the modes inhere8 (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 8B], p.350). 
Having in mind this ontology put forward in the Principles one can assert against Marion’s 
thesis that in the Rules the simple natures cannot play an ontological role because there is no 
metaphysical notion to which they would be subordinate, as in the case of the principal attribute and 
its modes. In the Rules the simple natures stand, so to speak, in a ‘horizontal’ condition of  
‘epistemological equality’ in relation to one another. In order for Descartes to raise the simple 
natures to an ontological status, it would be required first of all the existence of a notion capable of 
subordinating all the simple natures to itself. This subordinating notion would be responsible for 
establishing among the simple natures a ‘vertical’ or ‘hierarchical’ relation quite similar to that 
existing between the principal attribute (subordinating notion) and the modes (subordinated 
notions). But, as I have already stressed, Descartes makes it clear enough that in the Rules he is not 
dealing with any kind of ontological notion whatsoever. In fact, in Rule XII Descartes’ main 
concern is with a kind of ‘psychology of perception’. That is why we can find in the Rule XII 
neither the notion of principal attribute nor that of substance. And since, as claims Alquié, 
“Descartes reduces the substance to its essential attribute [...]” (ALQUIÉ, 1950, p. 6), without the 
attribute the substance cannot have a true existence and vice versa9. Thus, there are only modes or 
rather simple natures in the ‘ontology’ of the Rule XII, where again Descartes himself asserts that 
he is not concerned with metaphysical issues, that is, substances, attributes, modes. 
According to what was said above, it is plain that in the epistemological approach of the 
Rule XII there are neither the notion of substance, nor that of attribute, because these notions belong 
to the ontological realm. In my viewpoint, Descartes will be dealing with ontological issues only 
after he has put forward his mind-body dualism. As I have already pointed out, according to 
Descartes’ own words, the Rule XII is not concerned with the constitutive elements of reality; on 
the contrary, its task is just to explain how sensory perception and cognition are brought about in a 
mechanistic fashion. That is why Descartes has no need to talk about ontological or metaphysical 
issues in that work. So keeping the simple natures within their epistemological role is enough for 
his purpose in the Rules. Consequently, at this early stage of his philosophical career, the mere act 
of putting the simple natures in order would not allow Descartes to postulate ‘thought’ (cogitatio) as 
 
8  For more on this subject see ROZEMOND, 1998, p. 15. 
9 In fact, in Descartes’ view substance and principal attribute seems to be one and the same thing, “[f]or much of what 
he says suggests that the principal attribute constitutes the entire substance […]. On this view there is nothing to the 
substance over and above the principal attribute, as he indeed suggests in the Principles [AT 8B, I, 63]” (ROZEMOND, 




the principal attribute of the thinking substance (res cogitans). For the thinking substance, 
ontologically understood as a kind of ‘subject of inherence’ or ‘bearer of properties’, must exist 
before the existence of their modes, and not be a consequence of their logical entailment, as sustains 
Marion. As we have already seen, the simple natures will play the role of ‘modes’ in Descartes’ 
mature ontology. In other words, since the simple natures taken as modes pressuposes a principal 
attribute for their existence, it is logically and ontologically impossible to deduce the essence of the 
substance from the simple natures, as Marion wanted. So the subject of inherence, that is, the 
principal attribute, which represents the nature or essence of the substance, is supposed to have an 
existence prior to its modes, since the latter are ontologically dependent on the former. For this 
reason, I believe that the ‘metaphysical turn’, so to speak, in Descartes’ philosophy will only occur 
when a subject of inherence is postulated. I also believe that this outcome cannot be achieved just 
by putting the simple natures in a given order. Therefore, in opposition to what Marion holds, 
Descartes’ ‘metaphysical turn’ necessarily needs new elements and concepts. 
Nonetheless, by denying Marion’s interpretation of the metaphysical role of the simple 
natures I do not mean to suggest that there is a thorough gap between the Rules and the metaphysics 
presented in the Meditations, as it was vehemently held by Alquié (1950, p. 78)10. I think Alquié is 
right in claiming that the Rules as a whole has a clear concern with methodological and scientific 
issues11, as I have already pointed out. However, Descartes did not abandon the notions of simple 
natures when he left that work unfinished. On the contrary, these notions will play a fundamental 
role in the constitution of the notion of res cogitans and res extensa in the Meditations. That is why 
I must now agree with Marion’s statement, according to which “[a]t the very least we have to admit 
that, if the Regulae does not actually unfold a Cartesian metaphysics, it nonetheless articulates its 
fundamental concepts and assigns them a primary importance” (MARION, 1992, p. 118). These 
‘fundamental concepts’ are of course the simple natures. In fact, later on after being raised to a 
metaphysical status in the Meditations, the simple natures will reappear as the modes of substance 
in the Principles. But in order for this ‘metaphysical turn’ to be achieved, Descartes will need to 
work out a notion of ‘subject of inherence’ that is clearly absent of the Regulae.  
Thus, it will be by claiming that the notion of  a subject of inherence is absent of the Rules 
that I will answer Marion’s question: “why does Descartes not undertake to provide at least a sketch 
 
10 “The Regulae does not [...] contain any trace of metaphysics. On the contray, the uncertainty which remains in that 
work about the nature of the mind, and its tendence to assume all truths under the same program shows plainly that, 
when he wrote the Regulae, Descartes’ thought was still operating at a purely scientific level” (ALQUIÉ, 1950, p. 78). 




of his metaphysics in the Regulae, given that he has already got the requisite conceptual material at 
his disposal?” (MARION, 1992, p. 118). In the Rules Descartes has not yet worked out the 
metaphysical notion of a subject of inherence, that is, the concept of principal attribute or substance. 
It is true that Descartes had at his disposal as early as the Regulae the notions of simple natures 
which will be turned into the modes of his mature ontology presented in his Principles of 
philosophy; nonetheless, he has not yet at his disposal the subject of inherence in which the modes-
simple natures will inhere, that is, the notions of mind and its principal attribute, i. e., thought, and 
body and its principal attribute, i. e., extension. In other words, he has not yet worked out his 
conception of mind-body dualism. As Boyle cautiously puts it, “[...] there is little evidence that at 
the time of writing the Rules Descartes had clearly formulated his doctrine of two substances” 
(BOYLE, 2009, pp. 9-10). Normore, discussing the issue of whether an extended substance can be 
individuated by motion, a mode of body, raises exactly the same question I am asking to Marion: 
“[...] How something can be made to be what it is by something logically posterior to it and 
ontologically dependent on it” (NORMORE, 2011, p. 281). So, in my view, it is not by a mere 
process of putting together in an ordely way the simples natures that Descartes will arrive at his 
metaphysics. One can arguably say, as Marion does, that the Rules put forth the logical and 
conceptual elements, that is, the simple natures, elements on which Cartesian metaphysics will 
certainly be built. However, it is missing, I think, the methodological element that will enable 
Descartes to bring about the subject of inherence pressuposed by the modes in his mature ontology. 
Of course, the methodological element that is lacking in the Rules will not be provided by the 
structuralist method based on ‘order’ as proposed by Marion.  
I agree with Marion’s statement  according to which the simple natures will be employed 
in the Meditations to shape the notion of cogito. I think we can take it as an unquestionable fact. On 
the other hand, I do desagree with Marion because he does not offer any compelling reason                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
for explaining how the process of subordination among the simple natures occurs. In other words, 
Marion does not explain how the intellectual simple nature ‘thought’ (cogitatio) has come to occupy 
the central place among the simple natures that constitute the cogito. Marion himself clearly states 
what is at stake here, when he says that “[...] the items presented in Rule XII as a list of concepts, 
without any internal organization or ontological implication12, will reappear in the Second 
Meditation as an unfolding of the properties of cogitatio (thought) precisely because from this point 
 




onward thought has the status of a thing or res13” (MARION, 1992, p. 126). This fact described by 
Marion is completely true, but unfortunately he does not tell us what is the reason that explains it. 
So we are left with the impression that everything happened miraculously: from the Rules to the 
Meditations an epistemological notion (cogitatio) has suddenly become a ontological entity (res 
cogitans).  
However critical I may have been of Marion’s thesis about the relationship between the 
doctrine of the simple natures and Descartes’ cogito, I think there is still a possibility of accepting 
his statements on that issue under certain conditions. But first, before presenting this possibility, it 
is necessary to get rid of Marion’s structuturalist reading of Descartes’ Rule XII. This is a very 
important methodological step because it will allow us to take into consideration Descartes’ 
intellectual context and thus we will finally be able to assess the philosophical influences which 
may have acted upon his thought. For, as stressed by Rozemond, “[...] it is important for 
understanding Descartes to acknowledge that, like that of any thinker, his thought was embedded in 
the intellectual climate of his time. So consideration of historical context is very instructive about 
his views and arguments” (ROZEMOND, 1998, p. xii). Bearing this claim in mind, we have now to 
investigate what were the most influential ideas and thinkers in Descartes’ time. In doing so, we 
find out that the intellectual environment in France was mostly influenced by the thought of 
Augustine. In fact, according to Menn (1998, p. 6), “[...] in France there was no rival to Augustine’s 
prestige. He was an ineffaceable part of the intellectual background against which thinkers of the 
seventeenth century defined themselves”. Two good examples of this fact are the philosophers and 
theologians Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715), who started 
their careers as Augustinians and eventually became Cartesians, because both of them believed that 
Descartes himself was an Augustinian thinker. 
Given this intellectual context, it is natural that in Paris Descartes had possibly met many 
modern would-be followers of Augustine. The most important among them was certainly the 
cardinal Pierre de Bérulle (1575-1629), the founder of the Oratory14, who played a decisive role in 
spreading the doctrine of Augustine at Descartes’ time. In fact, “[i]t was Bérulle, more than anyone 
else, who had been instrumental in the revival of the Augustinian view” (GAUKROGER, 1997, p. 
207). At their meeting, Bérulle seems to have introduced and urged Descartes to study the thought 
of Augustine. Anyway, it is pretty fair to say that “Augustinianism was clearly an option open to 
 
13 That is, as a substance or the principal attribute of the res cogitans. 




Descartes […]” (GAUKROGER, 1997, p. 207). Accordingly, I strongly believe that this encounter 
with Augustinianism in Paris will not be without consequences for Descartes’ philosophy. In fact, 
in what follows, I will try to show that Augustine’s philosophy will play a decisive role in shaping 
Cartesian metaphysics. 
After his meeting with the cardinal Bérulle, Descartes moved to the Netherlands where, as 
he tells Mersenne in a letter, he spent his first nine months studying metaphysics: “It is with this 
[metaphysics] that I tried to begin my studies, and I can say that I would not have been able to 
discover the foundations of physics if I had not looked for them along that road. During my first 
nine months in this country [the Netherlands] I worked on nothing else” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 
1], p. 143-4). As this letter makes clear, the stay in the Netherlands marks a turning point in 
Descartes’ thought, for from this moment on metaphysics, as he himself suggests, will occupy a 
central place in the philosophical system he is going to build. In fact, fifteen years later in the 
Principles of Philosophy (1644), his most accomplished work, he will claim that metaphysics is the 
root of his system (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 9], p. 1). 
Thus, with the ‘discovery’ of the realm of metaphysics and its integration into his 
philosophical system it is then possible to clearly discern two phases in Descartes’ philosophy: the 
‘pre-metaphysical’ phase and the ‘post-metaphysical’ phase. The pre-metaphysical phase of 
Descartes’ career begins with the meeting and collaboration with Isaac Beeckman (1618-9) and 
ends with the unfinished work Rules for the direction of the mind (1628-9). The main concern of 
this period is with scientific and methodological issues. It is during this period that Descartes 
develops along with Beckmann his mechanical approach to natural philosophy15. The second phase 
of Descartes’ intellectual life begins at the very moment he realizes that metaphysics can be laid 
down as the foundation of his physics. This second phase begins when Descartes was introduced to 
the Augustinian thought by the cardinal Bérulle in Paris. Next, Descartes moves to the Netherlands. 
In this country, I think, following the suggestion given by the cardinal, Descartes will read and 
become acquainted with the works of the Bishop of Hippo. For at this moment the principal concern 
of his philosophical research is to find a metaphysics in which the mechanical science he had been 
building during the previous period of his career can be grounded. It was thus that his first nine 
months in the Netherlands were spent. 
 
15 Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) was a Dutch natural philosopher “[…] who introduced Descartes to a quantitative 
micro-corpuscularian natural philosophy, one that he [Descartes] was to reshape and make into his own very distinctive 




How did Descartes carry out his studies in the Netherlands in order to find out a 
metaphysics which could ground his physics? Did he just sit down and ‘meditate’ as he seems to 
suggest in describing his ‘metaphysical path’ through the Meditations? Or rather, did he read the 
work of some author who could teach him how to conduct his research and shape his metaphysical 
thought? Although, as I just said, Descartes in the Meditations seems to suggest the first option, in 
my view, there is more evidence for the truth of the second option. Apparently following the 
suggestion made by the cardinal Bérulle, the author Descartes chose to read was Augustine. Even if 
I have to admit that there is no absolute proof to show that Descartes was really reading Augustine’s 
works in the Netherlands, there seems to be striking evidence in Descartes’ Meditations that it 
might have happened. In fact, as extensively argued by Stephen Menn (1998), both Descartes and 
Augustine developed a metaphysics whose principal aim was to gain knowledge of God and the 
soul16. For both of them, the knowledge of the soul is the first step towards the knowlegde of God. 
And both of them, as we will see below, employ a very similar argumentative strategy to arrive at 
the knowlegde of the soul or of their own existence, namely the cogito argument. This argument, 
besides being aimed at undermining the sceptical worries concerning the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge, sets for both of them the path towards the proof of God’s existence17.  
Why is it so important  for my reading to take into consideration a hypothetical influence 
of Augustine’s thought over seventeenth-century France and more specifically on Descartes’ 
philosophy? The answer to this question is very simple and straightforward: because this fact can 
provide an alternative account for explaining the transition from the simple natures to Cartesian 
metaphysics, as well as for solving the difficulties I have found in Marion’s approach. As is widely 
known, Augustine seems to have put forward a kind of argument quite similar to the Cartesian 
cogito. In fact, according to Etienne Gilson (1961, pp. 41-2), the Bishop of Hippo had already put 
forward at least six times what Charles Taylor (1989) calls a ‘proto-cogito’ argument. As we will 
see just below, one can arguably sustain that the ‘Augustinian cogito’ has a undeniable similarity 
with the modern version of that argument presented in Descartes’ Meditations. That is why, in my 
view, it was under the influence of ‘Augustine’s cogito’ that Descartes found the inspiration to link 
the simple natures together so that he could shape his own cogito. In order to make clear how the 
 
16 Descartes announces to the theologians of the Faculty of Paris what are the main issues he will be dealing with in the 
short treatise he sent them. According to the French philosopher, “I have always considered that the questions 
concerning God and the soul were the main among those which are to be demonstrated by philosophical rather by 
theological argument” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 7], p. 1). Augustine in turn states his deep “[...] desire to know God 
and the soul” (AUGUSTINE, Soliloquia, I, 7).  




thought of the Bishop of Hippo might have influenced the constituion of Descartes’ cogito, in what 
follows I will be examining two paradigmatic passages of the work of the African philosopher in 
which he presents this so-called ‘proto-cogito’ argument. 
In Augustine’s City of God (De civitate Dei, XI, 26) we find the most famous statement of 
what came to be known as ‘the Augustinian cogito’18. The passage, aimed at being a refutation of 
the sceptical claims, runs like this: “What if you are deceived? If I am deceived, I am. For he who is 
not cannot be deceived; and for this very reason I am, if I am deceived. And since I am if I am 
deceived, how can I be decived in thinking that I am? It is certain that I am if I am deceived”. Of 
course, Augustine has in no way framed this argument by means of the notions of simple nature. 
This kind of notion was not at his disposal. Nonetheless, if we apply the notion of simple nature to 
analyze Augustine’s anti-sceptical argument above I think we could arrive at the very same and 
unexpected conclusion drawn by Marion from his structuralist-like standpoint concerning the 
Cartesian cogito. In fact, by applying the notions of simple nature to analyze Augustine’s argument 
we could say that the bishop of Hippo has linked the intellectual simple nature ‘be deceived’ (fallor) 
together with the common simple nature ‘to be’ (sum). Thus, like Descartes, Augustine is 
conditioning the certainty of the his existence (sum) to the possibility that he can be deceived 
through an intellectual act (fallor). So if we apply Marion’s analysis to the reading of Augustine’s 
so-called cogito argument we can see that there is a striking similarity between what Augustine did 
and what Descartes will do in his Meditations by putting the intellectual simple nature ‘ to doubt’ 
(dubito) together with the common simple nature ‘to exist’ (existere). 
In the dialogue On the free will (De libero arbitrio) Augustine puts forth once again his 
proto-cogito argument. Now he emphazises an important fact, also stressed by Descartes, that the 
certainty about one’s own existence must be proved at the very beginning of the philosophical 
research. So the certainty about one’s own existence becomes a kind of ‘philosophical principle’. 
That is why no doubt can subsist on this issue: “To get started with what is clearest I ask first 
whether you yourself exist. Are you perhaps afraid that you might be deceived by this question? In 
fact, if you did not exist, you could not be deceived at all” (Augustine, De libero arbritio, II, 3). 
Besides trying to establish a kind of ‘Archimedean point’ in which he would be able to ground the 
discussions he will engage in, as Descartes will do in his Meditations, we can also analyze this 
passage in terms of simple natures. Following Marion’s reading of Descartes’ Meditations in light 
of Rule XII, it is easy to identify that Augustine is once again linking together the intellectual 
 




simple nature ‘be deceived’ (fallor) with the common simple nature ‘exist’ (sum). From these 
considerations, we can see again that for Augustine the linkage of the simple natures will also 
guarantee the establishment of the first metaphysical truth, that is, the certainty of one’s own 
existence. So in order to prove that we know something with certainty, “[...] Augustine makes the 
fateful proto-Cartesian move: he shows his interlocutor that he cannot doubt his own existence, 
since ‘if you did not exist it would be impossible for you to be deceived’” (TAYLOR, 1989, p. 
132). 
In light of this textual evidence found in Augustine’s works and taking into consideration 
the suggestive studies on metaphysics carried out after his meeting with the Augustinian cardinal 
Bérulle, I think I can challenge Marion’s thesis, according to which “the transition to metaphysics 
depends not on any new elements or concepts, but merely on the necessity which links them [the 
simple natures] together – and this necessity depends in turn on order” (MARION, 1992, p. 119). 
Maybe it is possible to accept this thesis under the condition that the decisive influence of 
Augustine over ‘Descartes’ metaphysical turn’ be acknowledged. This means that one should 
acknowledge that Descartes not only linked tout court the simple natures together in order to arrive 
at the cogito argument, as Marion sustains; on the contrary, when Descartes decided to become a 
‘metaphysician’, he was probably acting under the influence of Augustine. For, as we just saw, in 
putting the simple natures in order, he was following a pattern of argument very common in 
Augustine’s thought. That is why – in opposition to Marion’s view – I do believe that there were 
without doubt “new elements or concepts” at Descartes’ disposal when he finally came to realize 
that he could bring forth the cogito argument, ‘the first principle’ of his philosophy, as Arnauld puts 
it19, by means of the linkage of the simple natures. And these “new elements and concepts” were 
borrowed from Augustine’s works. 
Now I think I can conclude this paper by asserting that it is not an absolutely new 
philosophy that will emerge in this so-called ‘post-Augustinian phase’, as the case of the conversion 
of the simple natures into the cogito and the remaining of the project of a mechanical science 
developed in the ‘pre-Augustinian phase’ make clear. Nonetheless, it seems that from this moment 
on, that is, from his acquaintance with Augustine’s thought, Descartes’ philosophy will be animated 
by an introspectively oriented metaphysics quite similar to that elaborated by the bishop of Hippo, 
 
19 “The first thing that I find remarkable is that this famous man [Descartes] has based his whole philosophy on the very 
same principle that was laid down by St. Augustine […]” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 7, Fourth objections to the 




as it is extensively shown by Menn20. As we see in the Meditations, this introspectively oriented 
metaphysics has at least two fundamental anti-Scholastic aims. By allowing Descartes to ‘withdraw 
the mind from the senses’, this introspectively oriented metaphysics has helped him to undermine 
Scholastic hylomorphism and also the empiricism associated with Peripatetic thought. As a result of 
this ‘inward turn’, themes of crucial importance to Cartesian metaphysics will appear, such as a 
nativist epistemology and a dualist ontology of mind and body. In discussing these ‘post-
Augustinian themes’, Scholars, aware of this  introspective shift in the spirit of Descartes’ 
philosophy, should not make the same mistake – as Marion does – of referring to works of the ‘pre-
Augustinian phase’ in order to solve problems of the ‘post-Augustinian phase’. For these reasons, I 
would like to suggest that these two phases of Descartes’ philosophy should be taken into 
consideration. For they will help us to prevent a tendency very common to structuralist-like analysis 
of the Cartesian system to study it as having a linear development, which can lead us stray in our 
research. It will also allow us to have a better understand of the development and constitution of 
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